Recently, Liaoning MSA rolled out monthly flag and port state detention data, with detailed vessel info and specific deficiency lists included.

Frankly, this disclosure puts pressure on PSCOs rather than benefiting them. No rewards for solid deficiency records, but loose documentation or wrong clause citations will lead to doubts.

This practice opens up deficiencies for industry research; the sector will scrutinize them via the PDCA cycle to achieve spiral growth in competence and skills. It greatly boosts industry transparency and inspection rigor, and raises the bar for PSCOs. Big kudos to Liaoning MSA for its courage! We hope all show more tolerance, and Liaoning and other MSAs keep up the disclosure to drive industry progress. Salute to Liaoning MSA!

Disclosed data shows 4 vessels detained in Jan 2025, all old ships built around 2000. Dalian MSA detained 3 and Yingkou 1, making Dalian MSA the top performer of Liaoning MSA. January detained vessels details:

Detention 1

On January 7, Dalian PSC detained the oil tanker PETERPAUL (IMO No.: 9163269) flying the Panamanian flag and classed with NK, with 2 detention deficiencies identified.

Deficiency 1 (07199): The small diameter self-closing control cock of sounding pipe termination for D.O. tank (S/S) in e/r not provided.

This deficiency means that the self-closing cock on the sounding pipe of the diesel oil tank in the engine room is missing.

It‘’s exactly the small fitting shown in the figure above. In some cases the weight is missing, in others the quick closing valve within the red circle is faulty—there are various such issues. PSCOs without an engine room background generally won’t conduct such a detailed inspection.

Deficiency 2 (15109)：the deficiencies above as objective evidences show that company SMS failed to be implemented on board, additional audit shall be carried out by R.O. before departure.

This deficiency indicates that the aforementioned deficiencies reflect the ineffectiveness of the vessel's SMS operation, requiring the RO to conduct an external audit prior to departure.

Regular readers of my articles should know this is the standard wording for SMS deficiencies.

Detention 2On January 15, Dalian PSC detained the oil tanker FAIR STAR (IMO No.: 9396672) flying the Liberian flag and classed with IRS, with 2 detention deficiencies identified.

Deficiency 1 (07114): uick-closing valve of D.O tank for emergency generator not directly connected with the D.O tank (two flanges between the D.O tank and the quick-closing valve, and the distance of them about 50cm)

This deficiency states that the quick closing valve mounted on the emergency generator fuel oil tank was improperly installed, due to a 50-centimeter pipe section between the two flanges.

The convention mandates that quick closing valves be installed "directly" on fuel oil tanks, yet it does not define what constitutes "directly"—this has led to divergent interpretations across the industry. Some argue that only a direct tapped connection qualifies as "direct", while others maintain that a flange connection is acceptable, provided that the distance between the quick closing valve and the tank is sufficiently short.

In general, the configuration illustrated in the figure below is deemed acceptable.

The configuration shown in the figure below is not acceptable.

That said, if we take a different approach and regard the pipe welded to the tank as an integral part of the tank itself (forming a single unit), wouldn’t this count as direct installation?

In reality, the pipe section between the tank outlet and the quick closing valve is not that critical. We appeal to all PSCOs to show a little leniency.

Deficiency 2 (06105): Gas sampling system for P/R defective when actual test from 0930 to 1200LT.The vessel was required to test the fixed hydrocarbon gas detection system, which showed a fault and remained unresolved from 0930 to 1200 local time.

Combustible gas concentrations on oil tankers must be monitored at all times. The issue may stem from a clogged sampling line or a faulty detector.

Detention 3

On January 18, Yingkou PSC detained the oil tanker ROZA (IMO No.: 9197909) flying the Cameroonian flag and classed with the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping (RS), with 4 detention deficiencies identified.

Deficiency 1 (08104): Power failure alarm of NO.1 and 2 steering gear found out of order on bridge.

This deficiency means the power failure alarms for No.1 and No.2 steering gears located on the bridge were malfunctioning.

Testing this item requires coordination between two PSCOs to detect the fault effectively.

Deficiency 2 (11101): Lifeboat(P/S) engine failed to start.

Both port and starboard lifeboat engines failed to start.

Deficiency 3 (14811): D-2 standard ballast water treatment plant not installed onboard.

The vessel was not fitted with a D-2 standard ballast water treatment system. With the full implementation of the D-2 standard for ballast water nowadays, the shipowner was extremely negligent.

Deficiency 4 (07106): Fault alarm of fire detecting system found out of order on bridge.

The fault alarm of the fire detection system on the bridge was malfunctioning.

Detention 4On January 24, Dalian PSC detained the bulk carrier VIVA ECLIPSE (IMO No.: 9438016) flying the Panamanian flag and classed with NK, with 4 detention deficiencies identified.

Deficiency 1 (07199): Sounding pipe of D.O storage tank in E/R - 1. small diameter control cock not self-closing type 2. oil level gauge defective

It is likely the same PSCO who detained this vessel and the one on January 7, as the deficiencies are almost identical. Again, the valves at the end of the sounding pipes for the engine room diesel oil storage tanks were non-self-closing, and the oil level gauges were also faulty.

Deficiency 2 (14608): Incinerator not reach working temperature within required time limit (600°C,5MINS)The incinerator failed to reach the required operating temperature of 600°C within 5 minutes.

Judging from the deficiency, this was a batch-fed incinerator.

Under Regulation 16 of MARPOL Annex VI, batch-fed incinerators require no preheating and must reach an in-chamber operating temperature of 600°C within 5 minutes of startup, with a stable temperature maintained above 850°C thereafter.

In terms of convention requirements, the deficiency is valid if PSC has sufficient evidence, confirmed facts and accurate test results.

However, I would remind everyone that the 600°C-in-5-minutes requirement caused a stir 5 to 8 years ago, and Indonesian PSC was particularly keen on enforcing this item.

There were disputes over the testing method for the 600°C in-chamber temperature within 5 minutes. At that time, manufacturers stated that this was a certification requirement that could only be accurately tested with dedicated armored probes; the ceramic probes actually installed in the incinerator chamber had delays, leading to inaccurate temperature readings. Nanjing Oasis and CCS both issued circulars on this matter, as shown in the figure below.

Later, PSC and the manufacturer held opposing views, and the deficiency was subsequently shelved. Now it is likely that younger PSCOs, when studying the conventions, have come across this item again and resumed testing. I suggest the vessel and PSC conduct friendly communication with the manufacturer to fully clarify this issue.

Deficiency 3 (08104): S/G alarm panel in E.C.R. and on bridge out of order.

The steering gear alarm panels in the Engine Control Room and on the bridge were malfunctioning.

Deficiency 4 (07199): NO.2 and NO.3 G/E F.O-D.O change-over valve, vessel regarded it as G/E isolation valve, defective.

The F.O-D.O change-over valves for No.2 and No.3 generator engines were mistakenly identified as fuel oil isolation valves on board; unfortunately, these valves were also faulty.

The above covers the detention cases of 4 vessels by Liaoning MSA in January. By reviewing general inspections of other vessels, we have summarized two key points for your reference:

The active PSCOs of Dalian MSA are mostly from an engine room background, and are particularly adept at inspecting boilers, engine room local water mist fire-fighting systems, incinerators, fuel oil isolation valves and aging oil tankers. Valves on tank sounding pipes, quick closing valves and fuel oil isolation valves of several detained vessels are all key inspection items. It is recommended to conduct focused checks before berthing.

The public data released by Liaoning MSA provides valuable directions for self-inspection and improvement across the industry. Shipowners, ship management companies and crew should strengthen maintenance targeting high-frequency deficiencies; PSCOs also need to strike a balance between professionalism and law enforcement discretion. Only through industry collaboration can we drive continuous improvement in maritime safety! Thumbs up for transparency initiatives and contributions to industry progress!

----------------------------------------Reprinted from PSCReady