Dear shipowners, ship managers, masters, chief engineers, and all seafarers sailing on ocean-going vessels, good day. I am the chief editor of pscoficer.

According to the port state control inspection data for the Republic of Korea officially released by the Tokyo MOU, in February 2026, Korean PSC authorities conducted a total of 130 PSC inspections at all ports nationwide. Of these, only 19 vessels received a zero-deficiency report, accounting for a mere 14.6% — a figure that in itself reflects the strictness of inspections.

More alarmingly, 14 vessels were detained directly during the month, representing a detention rate of 10.8%. These 14 detained vessels were issued a total of 156 deficiencies, among which 57 were actual detention-defining deficiencies. On average, each detained vessel had nearly 4.1 detention deficiencies recorded.

From the data, Korean PSC inspections are stricter and more stringent than those of neighboring Japan. All seafarers are advised to exercise extreme caution and remain fully vigilant.

Next, I will focus on First, key detention deficiencies and representative cases. Through an in-depth analysis of the detention deficiencies found on these 14 vessels, we have identified the following 5 types of deficiencies as the high-risk areas for detention by Korean PSC authorities this month. Each serves as a valuable lesson for ship masters calling at Korean ports. Please pay close attention and conduct thorough self-inspections in advance.

1. Compliance with the ISM Code (Deficiency Code 15150 recorded 7 times, 15109 recorded 4 times, totaling 11 occurrences) was the most frequent detention deficiency this month. This data indicates that 11 out of the 14 detained vessels were issued SMS-related deficiencies by the PSC, accounting for as high as 79%. It is fair to say that ISM is undoubtedly the most prominent and closely focused area for Korean PSC inspectors.

Notably, almost all specific equipment deficiencies, such as main engine damage (13101), fire pump failure (07113), lifeboat malfunction (11101), etc., were ultimately traced back to failures in the ISM system by inspectors. The PSC determined that the company’s Safety Management System (SMS) failed to ensure: effective maintenance of equipment (Element 10), proper development of shipboard operational procedures (Element 7), and adequacy of emergency preparedness (Element 8).

This shows that Korean PSC has become more sophisticated in inspections. They no longer regard isolated equipment deficiencies as isolated incidents, but tend to treat them as evidence of a comprehensive breakdown of the entire safety management system. As a result, even if shipowners apply for a review afterwards, the chance of success is extremely slim.

Pscoficer Inspection Reminder: Never regard system documents as useless paperwork just for perfunctory inspections. Every PSC deficiency issued must undergo a thorough root cause analysis, with strict implementation of corrective and preventive actions. In particular, repeated historical deficiencies must have complete and clear closed-loop rectification records. Even paperwork must be comprehensive and detailed enough to withstand scrutiny.

Prior to the ship’s arrival at the port, all equipment maintenance records, crew training records, emergency drill records, and rectification records of historical deficiencies must be reviewed against the system documents to ensure every item is recorded and closed properly. Practical crew training must be effectively implemented; never focus only on completing records while ignoring actual training. Otherwise, flaws will be exposed immediately once inspectors conduct random on-site operational checks.

2. Fire-fighting Equipment and Systems (Deficiency Codes: 07126, 07113, 07109, 04102, 07123, 07124, 07101, 07110, etc., with a total of 16 occurrences). Half of the vessels detained this month failed due to failures in engine room fire protection and fire-fighting systems, a zero-tolerance detention item.

High-frequency representative detention deficiencies this month include:

1. Excessive oily waste in the engine room (Code 07126): Characterized by heavy accumulation of oil and grease on the engine room floor, stern shaft drip trays, and in the separator area. There are even irregular practices such as using temporary facilities like rubber hoses and plastic buckets to collect or discharge oily waste. A common deficiency description is: Excessive oil mixture accumulated at bottom of engine room.

2. Total failure of fire pump and emergency fire pump (Code 07113). A common deficiency description is: Emergency fire pump not operated properly — emergency fire pump fails to generate sufficient pressure.

3. Serious deficiencies in fixed fire-fighting systems (Code 07109). Typical problems include: insufficient pressure in the CO₂ fire-fighting system actuating cylinders, jammed or inoperative alarm limit switches on engine room fire doors, or manually shut-down local water-based fire-fighting systems where sprinkler heads fail to discharge water automatically during crew on-site testing.

4. Failure of fire-resisting divisions and fire doors (involving Codes 07105, 07101, 07120, etc.). Examples include unapproved penetrations on Class A fire-resisting divisions without classification society certification, or fire doors on emergency escape routes that cannot close properly due to deformation or damage, losing their required fire resistance function. All fire doors on board must be kept fully closed and must not be secured open by any means.

Pscoficer Inspection Guidance:

Prior to the vessel’s arrival at Korean ports, the Master must personally organize the Chief Engineer and Chief Officer to conduct a comprehensive and thorough cleaning and inspection of the engine room area. The inspection shall cover every corner of the engine room, focusing on removing oil and grease around key equipment such as separators, main engine and generators. The use of non-compliant methods such as hoses or buckets to transfer or discharge oily water is strictly prohibited. Any form of oil accumulation must be completely eliminated without leaving hidden dangers.

Meanwhile, full-load operational tests shall be carried out on the main fire pump and emergency fire pump, with careful checks for leakages in the pump bodies, connecting pipelines and all valves. For the fixed CO₂ fire-fighting system and local water-based fire-fighting systems, cylinder pressure, pipeline integrity, valve operability and alarm functionality shall be inspected one by one. Unauthorized manual shutdown of any fire-fighting system is strictly forbidden.

In addition, all fire doors and fire-resisting divisions on board shall be inspected one by one to ensure the effective function of automatic door closers. Securing fire doors in the open position by any means is prohibited. Fire-stoppings at all cable and ventilation duct penetrations shall also be verified to be intact and undamaged.

3. Failure of key engine room equipment such as main and auxiliary engines, steering gear, etc., will directly result in the vessel being detained.

The ship’s main propulsion plant and steering gear are the most fundamental and critical equipment ensuring navigation safety. Any malfunction of such key equipment will directly impair the vessel’s seaworthiness.

Since China’s maritime authorities took the lead in launching special campaigns targeting main propulsion plants (refer to related documents: Shanghai MSA’s traditional “100% Inspection, 100% Detention” special campaign for mechanical and electrical equipment will become routine and continue until 2029! PSCOs in these two ports are cracking down on mechanical and electrical installations… China’s regional mechanical and electrical special inspections have officially started (with English notice attached)! Keep this in mind and you will no longer worry about detention.), the Republic of Korea Port State Control (PSC) has also adopted such strict standards.

At present, for any deficiencies related to the power system or steering system that affect the vessel’s navigation safety, Korean PSC officers will almost always issue a direct detention order with virtually no room for negotiation.

Pscoficer Inspection Reminder emphasizes:

Prior to the ship’s departure and arrival at the port, the Chief Engineer must personally lead a team to conduct a comprehensive operational test and condition check on the main engine, auxiliary engines, steering gear, and various key pumps.

Parts with defects such as oil or water leakage must be thoroughly repaired to ensure all relevant alarm systems are fully functional. Operation of any equipment with known defects is strictly prohibited.

For past deficiencies of the main engine and steering gear, it must be confirmed that permanent repairs have been completed. If permanent repairs cannot be carried out in a timely manner, reliable temporary measures and risk control plans must be implemented in strict accordance with classification society requirements, with complete approval and assessment documents kept on record for inspection. Any fluke mentality must be avoided.

4. Deficiencies in Life-Saving Appliances and Emergency Systems

Life-saving appliances on board must be maintained in an immediately operational condition at all times. Any failure during functional testing — such as a lifeboat engine failing to start — is equivalent to the equipment being unavailable in an emergency, posing a severe maritime safety risk. For this reason, such issues are common detention items during Port State Control (PSC) inspections.

Representative high-frequency detention deficiencies this month include:

1. Lifeboat engine failing to start, contaminated cooling system, and lubricating oil leakage; cracked steps or missing anti-slip mats on lifeboat embarkation ladders; inoperative limit switches on lifeboat davits; lifeboat release mechanisms failing to reset properly (corresponding to deficiency codes 11101, 11112, 11124).

2. Rescue boat engine failing to start, burst hydraulic hoses on the release system, rendering the rescue boat completely inoperable and unable to meet statutory requirements for immediate readiness (corresponding to deficiency codes 11104, 11113).

3. Emergency generator failing to start; multiple emergency lights out of service throughout the vessel, including those in the lifeboat embarkation area and deck escape routes (corresponding to deficiency codes 04114, 04103).

4. Life raft release mechanism jammed, embarkation passages blocked by debris; missing or expired equipment inside life rafts; expired batteries for two-way VHF radiotelephones (corresponding to deficiency code 11129).

Pscoficer Inspection Guidance requires:

Unauthorized modifications to lifeboats and rescue boats are strictly prohibited.

Comprehensive testing and maintenance of lifeboat and rescue boat engines, davits, release mechanisms, and all accessories must be conducted monthly.

Emergency generators must undergo regular load tests to ensure proper auto-start and parallel operation functions.

All emergency lights on board must be checked one by one; any damaged or inoperative units must be replaced immediately.

Before arrival at the port, the Chief Officer must lead a thorough, full-scope inspection of all life-saving appliances on board. Any expired, damaged, or inoperative equipment must be fully replaced in advance, rather than waiting for PSC officers to identify such deficiencies on site.

5. Failure of Ship Structural Integrity and Watertight/Weathertight Integrity

This is a critical weakness for elderly vessels, and such deficiencies are almost always detected during inspections.

Representative high-frequency detention deficiencies this month include:

1. Loss of weathertight integrity of hatch covers, resulting in water ingress and cargo damage. Specific issues include aged and hardened hatch sealing gaskets, inoperative locking devices, missing or jammed scuppers in hatch coamings, and severe corrosion of ventilators (corresponding to deficiency code 03104).

2. Severe corrosion and perforation of air pipe heads and ventilators, jammed or inoperative internal float devices, damaged closing arrangements, and missing fixing bolts for ventilation covers, which completely fail to maintain required weathertight integrity (corresponding to deficiency code 03108).

3. Holes in the hull structure or bulkheads, severe corrosion of decks and bulwarks causing steel plate thickness reduction; serious damage to watertight doors and weathertight doors, making them unable to close and secure properly (corresponding to deficiency codes 02138, 03107, 02199).

4. Illegible and unidentifiable load line marks and deck lines; severely deformed ship railings whose height no longer meets regulatory requirements (corresponding to deficiency codes 03102, 03103).

Pscoficer Inspection Advice:

Before arrival at the port, crew members of elderly vessels must conduct a full-scale inspection of the ship’s structure and all watertight/weathertight arrangements.

Inspectors shall use flashlights to carefully check every corner and concealed area.

For hatch covers, the condition of sealing gaskets, locking devices and drain valves shall be inspected one by one, and aged or damaged components shall be replaced on the spot.

For air pipe heads and ventilators, the operation of float devices, closing arrangements and corrosion conditions shall be fully inspected; serious defects such as perforations must be rectified immediately.

Holes and inoperative components shall be repaired without delay.

Closing tests shall be performed on all watertight doors and weathertight doors to ensure sound sealing performance and effective locking mechanisms.

Second, Deficiencies frequently recorded but not normally leading to detention.

Such deficiencies account for the majority of findings issued during Korean Port State Control inspections. Most are assigned action code 17 (rectification required prior to departure) or 16 (rectification required within 14 days), with a small number under code 99 (other requirements). Items with a high number of deficiencies are listed below:

1. Navigation Equipment, Passage Planning and Publications, their deficiency patterns:

Cracked housing of the starboard sidelight;

Inoperative fore and aft navigation lights;

Asynchronous heading data between radar display and main compass;

Malfunction of the rudder angle indicator on the starboard bridge wing;

Multiple non-compliances in passage planning, e.g. missing critical information, failure to cover the full berth-to-berth voyage, and not updated to the current anchorage route; 2025 edition of Volume III of the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual (IAMSAR) and the International Code of Signals not carried on board as required;

Lack of familiarization training for the Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS), missing critical navigation information (e.g. underkeel clearance) in the system, and untimely updates of chart data.

Passage planning issues have long been a challenging area and often cause difficulties for the responsible Third Officer. For details, please refer to relevant cases in the detention prevention guide available for download!

2. Fire Safety, their main deficiency patterns:

Abnormal pressure indication of fixed CO₂ fire-fighting system, with its alarm device jammed in an abnormal status;

Water-based fire-extinguishing system intentionally shut down manually;

Clogged nozzles of the water spray fire-extinguishing system in the paint store;

Engine room escape route blocked by debris, engine room escape door secured in the open position by ropes;

Clogged oil discharge pipeline of the oil separator, resulting in oil accumulation;

Fire doors or fire dampers secured in the open position by bindings;

Fire hoses of non-compliant length and suffering from leakage.

3. Emergency Supply Capacity of Equipment, their main deficiency patterns:

Emergency generator failing to start properly, losing critical emergency power supply capability;

Emergency lights on life rafts unable to illuminate the water surface effectively, inoperative emergency light at the starboard upper deck exit, severely affecting evacuation and rescue operations in emergencies;

Leakage at the flexible joint of the fire main on the side of No.2 cargo hold, reducing fire-fighting water pressure and affecting fire-fighting efficiency.

4. Pollution Prevention, their main deficiency patterns:

Garbage bins in accommodation areas not marked in accordance with the Garbage Management Plan, improper volume control of Category A and C garbage, and recorded actual discharge exceeding the approved permitted volume;

Sewage treatment system unable to provide documents or records regarding the approved discharge rate of untreated sewage;

Improper ballast water management, e.g. using a portable pump to transfer accumulated water from the emergency fire pump room to No.1 port ballast tank;

Bunkering operations not conducted in strict accordance with procedures specified in the Bunkering Check List.

5. Ship Security, their main deficiency patterns:

Security drill not conducted within one week after crew change exceeding 25%;

Ineffective registration and control at the gangway when PSC officers board the vessel.

Specifically:

No security drill held within one week after crew change exceeding 25%; access control not effectively maintained at the gangway – visitor identification not checked, nor temporary boarding passes issued to visitors.

Third, Actual Deficiency Examples

Classified descriptions alone may not be intuitive enough. From the actual deficiencies issued during recent Port State Control inspections in Korea, the editor has specially selected 30 representative items for listing. These are all real cases that occurred just this February, serving as hard-learned lessons. Please conduct self‑inspections item by item, and make sure to rectify any similar issues in advance!

The main engine had been found damaged during an inspection at Port Klang on 15 December 2025. Since then, the vessel had sailed from Zhoushan to Pyeongtaek Port without permanent repairs being carried out, resulting in reduced propulsion capability. A detention deficiency was therefore issued directly.

 The emergency fire pump room was flooded, submerging the motor junction box. The motor insulation resistance was measured at 0 MΩ, rendering the pump completely inoperative. A detention deficiency was issued directly.

Large amounts of oil and grease had accumulated on the engine room floor and in the stern shaft drip tray area. Unapproved plastic buckets were used in the separator area to collect discharged oily waste, resulting in completely uncontrolled fire risks. A detention deficiency was issued directly.

The steering gear alarm system was completely non-functional. During emergency steering testing, the rudder took 3 minutes and 53 seconds to move from 15° on one side to 15° on the other, far exceeding the regulatory requirement of 28 seconds. A detention deficiency was issued directly.

Weathertight integrity of the hatch covers was lost, causing cargo damage due to water ingress in No. 2 cargo hold. Inspection revealed aged hatch sealing gaskets and inoperative locking devices on most units. A detention deficiency was issued directly.

A hydraulic hose ruptured during operation of the rescue boat launching appliance, rendering the unit completely inoperable and failing to meet the requirement for immediate readiness. A detention deficiency was issued directly.

Both port and starboard lifeboat engines could not be started by battery. The starboard lifeboat emitted heavy black smoke during test running, and its release mechanism failed to reset properly. A detention deficiency was issued directly.

The fixed local water‑based fire‑fighting system had been manually shut down. After a fault alarm, the sprinklers in the separator area failed to discharge water automatically. This same deficiency had already caused vessel detention during a PSC inspection in Hong Kong in September 2025, yet the ship had not conducted a root cause analysis or implemented effective preventive measures. The vessel was therefore detained directly again for the same issue during this inspection.

The fuel oil sulfur content was found to exceed the limit by portable detector testing. The measured value in the service tank was as high as 0.939%, well above the regulatory maximum of 0.5%. The vessel was detained directly as a result.

The main engine was known to be severely damaged, yet the ship had not carried out risk assessment, reporting or arranged permanent repairs in accordance with the Safety Management System requirements. The inspector therefore determined a failure of the SMS and issued a detention deficiency.

Heavy leakage of lubricating oil occurred at the connections of the pressure transmitter and pressure gauge of No. 2 generator, resulting in oil covering the engine room floor and posing a serious safety hazard. The vessel was detained directly.

The Shaft Power Limitation (ShaPoLi) system was not effectively managed in accordance with regulatory requirements, and crew members in key positions were completely unfamiliar with its operation. The vessel was detained directly.

The sewage treatment unit suffered from incorrectly connected chemical dosing pipelines and a faulty dosing pump, with its high-high level alarm continuously activated. This deficiency was already identified by the Chinese maritime authorities in October 2025 but had not been properly rectified to date. The vessel was therefore detained directly.

Serious deficiencies existed in the arrangement of the fixed CO₂ fire-fighting system for cargo holds: the system was installed in a 20-foot shipping container on the forecastle deck without permanent securing arrangements. Meanwhile, the volume of the CO₂ room was not included in the ship's tonnage calculation as required. The vessel was detained directly.

Leakage alarms and fuel collection arrangements for the main high-pressure fuel pipe casings were missing, fully non-compliant with regulatory requirements. The vessel was detained directly.

The 15 ppm alarm function of the oily water separator could not be properly tested. This deficiency was already detected by PSC in September 2025 and reoccurred during this re-inspection. The vessel was detained directly.

Heavy items such as steel ladders and steel pipes stored in the bosun's store were unsecured and randomly placed, posing a risk of falling over. Rectification prior to departure was required.

The fire door of the emergency escape route on the second deck cannot be fully closed as its self-closing device has failed. Rectification is required prior to departure.

Garbage bins installed in the accommodation area were not marked with corresponding categories in accordance with the approved Garbage Management Plan. Rectification required within 14 days.

The Seafarer Employment Agreements on board did not indicate the contract expiry date or the amount of paid annual leave. Rectification required within 14 days.

The emergency generator failed to start during testing. Rectification required prior to departure.

The housing of the starboard upper sidelight was cracked, and the anti-glare screens of both port and starboard sidelights were not coated with matte black paint as required. Rectification required prior to departure.

The waypoint table in the voyage plan did not indicate the key information of vessel squat. Rectification required prior to departure.

Valve caps were missing from multiple drain valves of cargo hold hatch covers. Rectification required prior to departure.

The coverage of emergency lights installed in the life raft embarkation area could not effectively illuminate the water surface. Rectification required prior to departure.

Security control measures at the ship’s boarding access were not implemented. Inspectors reached the bridge directly without presenting identification, with no verification throughout the process. Rectification required prior to departure.

Fire dampers in the funnel were not marked with their open/closed status. Rectification required prior to departure.

Heading data displayed by radar and repeat compasses was not synchronized with the main gyrocompass. Rectification required prior to departure.

The motor of No. 2 ballast pump was not repaired after being disassembled and is completely inoperative. Rectification prior to departure is required.

Unapproved rubber hoses by the classification society were used at multiple pipeline connections in the engine room. Rectification prior to departure is required.

Overall, the enforcement standards of Korean Port State Control inspections are stricter than those in Japan. In particular, higher requirements are imposed on the actual functionality of equipment and the implementation of the Safety Management System. Inspections of elderly vessels and open‑registry ships are particularly rigorous.

If shipowners or management companies have reliable local agents or channels and can make thorough preparations in advance for inspections, they will naturally avoid many detours.